Sins of Omission: Abstention in Democratic Institutions by Hayden, Grant M.
SINS OF OMISSION: ABSTENTION IN
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
Grant M. Hayden*
Assumptions regarding the effect of an abstention guide the theo-
ry and practice of abstention across the full range of democratic deci-
sionmaking. Sometimes, however, these assumptions are false, and
may prevent voters from achieving their objectives. This Article exam-
ines the effect that abstention has under common voting procedures,
dispelling many assumptions that voters make about the effect of an
abstention.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Voters make a couple of assumptions about the effect of an absten-
tion. First, they assume that an abstention is neutral with respect to the
result: that it affects all alternatives in equal measure.' Second, and relat-
ed, they think that their preferred alternative is more likely to win if they
vote and, conversely, less likely to win if they abstain.2 These assumptions
guide the theory and practice of abstention across the full range of demo-
cratic decisionmaking. As it turns out, however, these assumptions are of-
ten false.
Under many common voting procedures, an abstention has the ef-
fect of casting a weighted vote in favor or against the proposition. More-
over, there are a range of circumstances in which voters are more likely
to achieve their desired outcomes by abstaining rather than by voting
their true preferences. Together, these two features of abstention under-
mine widespread beliefs about the consequences of abstention and may
prevent voters from achieving their objectives.
The counterintuitive effects of abstaining would not be that signifi-
cant if the occasions that gave rise to them occurred infrequently (or not
at all). But, alas, this is not the case. Instead, a wide range of democratic
institutions, from garden clubs to state legislatures, make use of vulnera-
ble voting procedures. And, in many cases, even where professional law-
makers are involved, voters are fooled into voting or abstaining when
they would be better off, by their own measures, by doing the opposite.
The first part of this Article will briefly (and, I hope, painlessly) lay
out the mechanics of voting situations where abstention can have coun-
terintuitive results. In the second part, comprising the bulk of the Article,
I will closely examine two specific situations where this occurs, where
vulnerable voting procedures are used by relatively unsophisticated vot-
ers. The first involve the smaller deliberative bodies-from municipal
corporations to business entities to nonprofit organizations -that rely on
the parliamentary procedures and advice of Robert's Rules of Order. The
second situations involve larger electorates-the general public, really-
participating in an election method commonly used throughout the South
in both state and federal elections: the plurality runoff procedure. To-
gether, these two situations involve countless voters making mistaken as-
sumptions about the consequences of abstaining in ways that alter elec-
toral outcomes and prevent them from achieving their goals.
1. See Grant M. Hayden, Abstention: The Unexpected Power of Withholding Your Vote, 43
CONN. L. REv. 585,596 (2010).
2. See id. at 601.
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II. THE UNEXPECTED POWER OF WITHHOLDING YOUR VOTE
A. The Power of Abstention
The effect of an abstention depends upon the election procedures,
and a key element of those procedures is the quota. The quota is the deci-
sion threshold-such as a majority, two-thirds, and the like -and may be
either an absolute or relative requirement. An absolute quota demands a
certain number of votes in favor of a proposition; a relative quota merely
requires a certain fraction of votes in favor of a proposition.3 In a demo-
cratic organization with 100 members, a question requiring an absolute
majority would require 51 votes in favor in order to pass, no matter how
many members actually voted. A question requiring a relative majority
would require only a majority of the votes cast. If, for example, 20 mem-
bers abstained, then the question would require only 41 votes (a majority
of the remaining 80 voters). Simply put, an absolute quota does not
change with respect to the number of voters, but a relative quota does.
Absolute quotas are not as prevalent as relative quotas. When they
do occur, they are typically required of votes that effectuate some pro-
found change to an institution.4 Proposed amendments to the U.S. Con-
stitution, for example, require ratification by an absolute quota of three-
fourths of the states,' and corporate mergers must be approved by an ab-
solute majority of shareholders.' Once in a while, such quotas are used for
more mundane matters-some states, for example, require their legisla-
tures to pass laws using absolute majority quotas. But most organizations
follow the lead of Robert's Rules of Order and disfavor absolute quotas in
such situations.
The consequences of abstaining in absolute quota situations is rela-
tively straightforward: an abstention has the same effect on the outcome
as casting a vote against the proposition.7 In terms of voting weights, an
abstention with an absolute quota functions the same as casting a vote
weighted one 100 percent against the proposition. While an abstention in
these situations does not express anything close to indifference, it is diffi-
cult to imagine that many voters, once they know they are voting in an
absolute quota situation, will make such a mistake.
Relative quotas, though, are a different matter. Though they are
used much more frequently than absolute quotas," the effect of absten-
tions is not as straightforward. When a voter decides to abstain, it re-
3. For a more extensive discussion of this, see id at 605-06.
4. For a general discussion of absolute majority quotas, see Adrian Vermeule, Absolute Majori-
ty Rules, 37 BRIT. J. POL. ScI. 643, 643-47 (2007).
5. U.S. CONsT. art. V (providing that amendments "shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States or by
Conventions in three fourths thereof . . . ").
6. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2014).
7. See Hayden, supra note 1, at 606.
8. See id at 607.
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moves the potential voter's support for (or opposition to) the proposition
and it reduces the number of votes needed to pass the proposition.' The
abstainer's potential support or opposition to the proposition, however, is
not necessarily reduced in equal measures; instead, it is removed in pro-
portion to the quota. 0 "In other words, . . . abstaining has the same effect
on the outcome as casting a vote in favor of the proposition weighted at
the level of the quota.""
Some simple examples show how this works." Take an organization
with 24 members making a decision with a three-fourths relative quota. If
all 24 members vote on the proposition, then 18 votes are needed for pas-
sage. A straw poll taken before the actual vote, however, reveals that 17
members support passage and 7 oppose it, meaning the proposition will
likely fail. But let's say that 4 members-2 in favor and 2 opposed-
decide to abstain. If abstentions don't have any effect on outcomes, then
we would generally expect the result to stay the same, because we have
an equal number on each side of the question withholding their votes.
What actually happens, though, is that the measure passes 15 to 5. The
abstentions were not the fifty-fifty propositions the voters (and we) might
have expected; instead each abstention had the effect of casting a vote
weighted three-fourth (the level of the quota) in favor of passage.
The same holds true for any relative quota. With a relative quota of
unanimity (100 percent support), an abstention has the same effect as
casting a full vote in favor of the proposition.' With a relative quota of,
say, one-fourth, an abstention has the effect of casting a vote weighted
one-fourth in favor of passage (and three-fourths against). Only with a
relative majority quota does an abstention have a neutral effect on the
result, because in that case, a vote weighted at the level of the quota is, as
expected, a fifty-fifty proposition.4
What this means is that in situations using relative quotas other than
a simple majority, there may be a disconnection between perception and
reality. People might expect that abstentions will have no effect on out-
comes-that withholding a vote is essentially the same as casting a vote
fifty-fifty for and against a proposition. In reality, this will not be true in
any relative quota situation other than a simple majority. This counterin-
tuitive effect is compounded by the fact that minority and supermajority
quotas are used to facilitate or hinder passage of certain types of proposi-
tions, and abstentions in those situations have the opposite effect. In su-
9. See id. at 607-08.
10. See id. at 608.
11. See id.; Sreejith Das, Abstaining (Almost) Never Expresses Indifference: A Short Note on
Abstention in Weighted Voting Games, 34 (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
12. For additional examples, see Hayden, supra note 1, at 608-13.
13. See id. at 608.
14. See id. at 612. This is true of the most common definition of a majority quota, which is "more
than half." But, if the majority quota is defined as fifty percent of those casting a vote plus one vote,
the abstention actually casts a weighted vote in favor of the proposition, with the exact weight depend-
ing upon the number of voters. See id. at 611-12.
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permajority situations, where voting procedures are designed to make
passage most difficult, abstentions have the effect of casting a vote
weighted in favor of passage." And in situations demanding less than ma-
jority support, where voting procedures are designed to make passage
relatively easy, abstentions are weighted against passage.'6 All of this
makes it likely that voters contemplating an abstention will make mis-
takes. But the unexpected power of abstention in relative quota situations
is not the only way voters may fall victim to the hazards of withholding
their votes.
B. Abstaining to Win
There are other potential voting situations where people's expecta-
tions are at odds with reality. One of the most significant of these is when
voters are more likely to achieve their desired outcomes by abstaining ra-
ther than voting their true preferences. This surprising feature of absten-
tion can happen when election procedures and voter preferences combine
to produce something known as the "No-Show Paradox.""
The No-Show Paradox occurs when a voter is better off by not vot-
ing than by voting her preferences." Consider, for example, a group of 9
people trying to make a decision about what type of ice cream to pur-
chase (vanilla, chocolate, or strawberry) using a common legislative pro-
cess, the amendment procedure." The group's preference profile over the
three alternatives, with the most desired alternative on top, is as follows: 20
TABLE 1
2 voters 3 voters 2 voters 2 voters
Vanilla Chocolate Strawberry Strawberry
Chocolate Strawberry Vanilla Chocolate
Strawberry Vanilla Chocolate Vanilla
15. See id. at 611 (emphasis added).
16. See id. at 614 (emphasis added).
17. The paradox was first described by Peter C. Fishburn and Steven J. Brams in Paradoxes of
Preferential Voting: What Can Go Wrong with Sophisticated Voting Systems Designed to Remedy Prob-
lems of Simpler Systems, 56 MATHEMATICS MAG. 207 (1983). See also Hayden, supra note 1, at 596-98;
HANNU NURMI, VOTING PARADOXES AND How TO DEAL WITH THEM 49 (1999).
18. See NURMI, supra note 17, at 49.
19. For a full description of the procedure, see WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST
POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF
SOCIAL CHOICE 69-73 (1982); see also HENRY M. ROBERT ET AL., ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER 130-67
(2004); Grant M. Hayden, Note, Some Implications ofArrow's Theorem for Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 295, 301-02 (1995).
20. This is an example of the strong no-show paradox. See Hannu Nurmi, Monotonicity and Its
Cognates in the Theory of Choice, 121 PUB. CHOICE 25, 33-34 (2004).
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If the agenda of pairwise votes in the amendment procedure is Va-
nilla vs. Chocolate, winner to face Strawberry, then the social choice if
everyone votes is Chocolate (since Chocolate beats Vanilla 5 to 4 in the
first found, and Chocolate beats Strawberry 5 to 4 in the second round).
But if the two voters on the right decide to abstain, then Strawberry, their
first-ranked alternative, wins (since Vanilla beats Chocolate 4 to 3, and
then Strawberry beats Vanilla 5 to 2). If those two abstaining members
had voted their true preferences, their first-ranked alternative would
have lost. As it happened, by withholding their votes, their first-ranked
alternative wins, and it's strawberry ice cream for all!
Aside from the fiction that anybody actually likes strawberry ice
cream,21 there's nothing terribly implausible about this scenario. The
amendment procedure is a well-known parliamentary voting procedure. 22
In fact, every voting procedure that picks the Condorcet winner, when
one exists, is vulnerable,23 as are parliamentary procedures that use a
quorum requirement. 24 And the ability of people to vote strategically-
that is, vote against one's true preferences to ultimately achieve their de-
sired outcome-has long been part of the democratic equation. 5 So while
it hasn't been the subject of much scholarly attention, it shouldn't be that
surprising that voters can also manipulate outcomes by strategically ab-
staining in such situations. Many of these vulnerable procedures, though,
are used in legislative bodies, where we might expect members to be
more aware of the possible consequences of abstaining. But some voting
methods used in large-scale elections, such as plurality runoff procedures,
involve less sophisticated voters. And it is these situations where voters
may be more likely to make mistakes.
21. Well, it turns out that quite a few people actually do like strawberry ice cream-indeed, it's
the fifth most popular flavor in the United States. I suppose I should have said "any person with good
taste."
22. For a full description of the procedure, see RIKER, supra note 19, at 69-73; Saul Levmore,
Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REv. 971, 1012-14
(1989) (noting the ubiquity of the amendment procedure and its vulnerability to voting paradoxes);
Implications ofArrow's Theorem, supra note 19, at 301-02.
23. See Herv6 Moulin, Condorcet's Principle Implies the No Show Paradox, 45 J. ECON. THEORY
53, 55 (1988). The Condorcet winner is the option that would beat each of the other options in a series
of simple pairwise contests. For background on the Condorcet voting procedures, see RIKER, supra
note 19, at 67-69.
24. See Paulo P. C6rte-Real & Paulo T. Pereira, The Voter Who Wasn't There: Referenda, Repre-
sentation and Abstention, 22 Soc. CHOICE & WELFARE 349, 351 (2004); Luis Aguiar-Conraria & Pedro
C. Magalbihes, Referendum Design, Quorum Rules and Turnout 2 (Sept. 5, 2009) (unpublished Am.
Political Sci. Ass'n, 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract-id=1451131; see also Hayden, supra note 1, at 600-01.
25. Indeed, the most famous corollary of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem-that all nondictatorial voting procedures are vulnerable to strategic manipula-
tion. See Allan Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, 41 ECONOMETRICA 587,
587 (1973); Mark Allen Satterthwaite, Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Cor-




III. MISTAKEN ABSTENTIONS: THE SINS OF OMISSION
The degree of this disconnection between perception and reality,
and thus the likelihood of unexpected results, will depend on the situa-
tion. The two key variables are the sophistication of the voters and the
structure of the voting process. Professional legislators, especially those
assisted by party whips and parliamentarians, are not likely to be fooled
by the effects of an abstention (though, as we'll see below, this is not al-
ways the case). Members of smaller, less professional institutions (school
boards, homeowners associations, civic clubs, and the like), and citizens
casting ballots in more ordinary political elections, are much more vul-
nerable. Any counterintuitive features of a voting process are likely to
lead unsophisticated voters to make mistakes with respect to absten-
tion-mistakes that lead them to vote or abstain against their own inter-
ests -whether or not they ever realize it.
The structure of a particular vote will also play a major role in pro-
ducing unexpected outcomes. As we've seen, the effect of abstention with
an absolute quota is relatively straightforward -abstaining is the same as
voting against a proposition. Relative quotas, though, are a different mat-
ter, with a mix of expected and unexpected possibilities. Where a vote is
taken using a simple majority quota-which, thankfully, describes most
situations-the effect of an abstention won't fool anybody. Most people
who abstain expect that it will have no effect on the outcome and, with
such a quota, they are exactly right-withholding your vote has a neutral
effect on the outcome, similar to casting a vote weighted fifty-fifty for and
against the proposition. The same is not true, however, for any relative
quota other than a majority quota: it is these voting situations that can
cause the most trouble.
A. Small Electorates Using Two-Thirds Quotas
There are many decisions that require something other than a rela-
tive majority quota, though they don't occur with equal frequency. Some,
in fact, hardly arise at all. The U.S. Constitution, for example, requires
that one-fifth of those present may demand a roll call vote in either house
of Congress."6 If members abstain by being absent from the chambers, the
abstention, as it does in all relative quota situations, functions as a vote in
favor of the proposition weighted at the level of the quota. But because
the quota here is less than a majority, such an abstention actually func-
tions as a vote weighted 80 to 20 against having a roll call vote. 27 That's
the kind of counterintuitive effect that could catch voters off guard, but,
in this case, we're talking about professional legislators voting on a rela-
tively insignificant procedural requirement. Relative quota requirements
at other levels -three-fifths, three-quarters, unanimous, and the like-
26. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 5, cl. 3.
27. An extended discussion of this example is found in Hayden, supra note 1 at 612-13.
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also show up occasionally, and while abstaining in such situations might
produce some unexpected results, those relative quotas do not show up as
part of the democratic machinery of very many democratic institutions or,
when they do, they do not get invoked that often.
The one exception is the two-thirds supermajority quota. This re-
quirement shows up quite often in a variety of circumstances, legislative
and non-legislative, and is often used in very significant votes. In the most
well-known example, Congress may override a presidential veto on a
two-thirds vote of both houses." Congress is required to meet the same
quota when proposing constitutional amendments,29 and the Senate must
meet that quota to ratify treaties' or convict someone in an impeachment
proceeding."' State legislatures also have similar requirements for im-
portant decisions.3 2
Many organizations also use two-third relative quotas to make sig-
nificant decisions. The Board of Governors of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, for example, is a 35-member body that elects its Director
General using a two-thirds relative quota.33 And the many organizations
using Robert's Rules of Order, as we shall see, use the quota to do things
like remove people from office," take away membership," or close debate
on a question. 6 These are all significant decisions, and they all require a
two-thirds relative majority quota. They are also the situations where
voters (or, more correctly, abstainers) are most likely to make a mistake.
Here's how that might happen. Take a simple example of a body
with 18 voters making a decision that requires a two-thirds relative quota.
If all members cast a ballot, 12 votes are required for approval. Let's say
that, in the first round of voting, the vote is 11 to 7 in favor of the pro-
posal. The measure fails. Now let's assume that, prior to a second round
of voting, 3 of the original voters against the proposition are persuaded to
abstain. These 3 voters aren't complete fools, though, and take care to
ensure that an equal number of voters in favor of the proposition also ab-
stain. In other words, they "pair" their abstentions with members of the
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
29. Id. art. V.
30. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
31. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
32. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 7 ("[I]f approved by two-thirds of the members elected to that house,
it shall become a law notwithstanding the objections of the Governor"); S.C. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 ("If
it is agreed to by two-thirds of the members elected to each House, the amendment or amendments
must be entered on the Journals respectively... ."); Ill. CONST. art. IV, § 14 ("Impeachments shall be
tried by the Senate).
33. See IAEA, THE STATUTE OF THE IAEA, arts. VI-VII, available at http://
www.iaea.org/About/statute.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2015); Sharon Otterman & Alan Cowell, Atomic
Agency's New Chief Favors Strict Policy on Iran, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2009, at A12. For a discussion of
the abstention that resulted in the election of the current Director General, see Hayden, supra note 1,
at 609-11.
34. HENRY M. ROBERT ET AL., ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER NEWLY REVISED IN BRIEF 122
(First Da Campo Press eds., 2004).
35. Id. at 122-23.
36. Id. at 35-36. For a list of all votes requiring a two-thirds majority, see id. at tbl. E 197.
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opposition, thinking that, in so doing, they are ensuring that their absten-
tions will not affect the outcome of the vote.37
So what happens in the second round of voting? The vote is 8 to 4,
and, to surprise of at least three of the abstaining members, the measure
passes. The math is simple enough. With 6 members abstaining, only 8
votes are needed for approval (two-thirds of the remaining 12 voters). By
abstaining, the 6 voters did not merely cancel each other out as they
would if abstentions had the effect of casting a vote weighted fifty-fifty.
Split fifty-fifty, the effective vote would have been the same 11 to 7 tally,
and the outcome would not have changed. But, because of the two-thirds
relative quota, the abstentions had the effect of casting 6 votes weighted
two-thirds in favor of the proposition, or 4 in favor and 2 against. This
mean that the effective vote moved from 11 to 7 to 12 to 8, and the meas-
ure passed. Whether we describe these abstentions as weighted votes or
as a reduction in the quota with an uneven effect on the proposition, the
result is the same. The abstentions were not neutral, but equivalent to
votes weighted at the level of the quota.
1. Legislatures
The structure of a two-thirds relative majority quota, then, provides
fertile ground for mistakes. This can even happen to the most sophisticat-
ed voters. Terry Radtke describes just such a situation involving members
of the Wisconsin Assembly.3 8 The Wisconsin legislature was attempting to
override a gubernatorial veto of a bill on bar integration." Wisconsin law,
like that of the federal government and many other states, required a
two-thirds supermajority to override the veto.4 The Wisconsin Senate
overrode the veto 22 to 8.41 The vote was much closer, though, in the Wis-
consin Assembly, where the bill had originally passed 60 to 31.42 When
the bill returned to the Assembly for the override vote, eight of its mem-
bers were absent and, according to custom, those eight members paired
their votes with members on the other side of the issue.43 This is where
the mistake was made.
Wisconsin, like the U.S. Congress, allowed pairing, a practice in
which absent members agree to be recorded on opposite sides of the is-
sue." The paired votes are not counted in the vote total (and are thus ab-
stentions), but are usually reported in the record to assure constituents
that the absence of their representative did not affect the outcome of the
37. More on the process of "pairing" below.
38. Terry Radtke, The Last Stage in Reprofessionalizing the Bar: The Wisconsin Bar Integration
Movement, 1934-1956,81 MARQ. L. REv. 1001, 1012-14 (1998).
39. Id. at 1013.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1012-13.
43. Id. at 1013.
44. Id.
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vote.45 This all works perfectly well with the more usual relative majority
quota; it does not work so well, without some tinkering, with any other
quota. After pairing off eight sets of two votes, the Wisconsin Assembly
voted 51 to 25 to override the governor's veto, meeting, just barely, the
required two-thirds majority.46 When the speaker declared that the As-
sembly had overridden the governor's veto, the announcement "caused
an uproar in the Assembly."47 The mistaken decision to pair the votes
one-to-one was critical-had the paired votes been cast, the vote would
have been 59 to 33, short of the two-thirds requirement. Each of the ab-
stentions functioned not as a fifty-fifty proposition, but as a vote weighted
two-thirds in favor of the bill. As it was, Wisconsin legislators learned
about the power of abstention the hard way.
While professional lawmakers are not often caught off guard like
this, this anecdote shows that the counterintuitive effects of an abstention
can fool even the best of them. The U.S. Senate, for example, appears to
have taken this lesson to heart. While Senators often engage in vote pair-
ing,48 they make sure that, in situations requiring a two-thirds majority,
the votes are "paired" in the ratio of two votes in favor to one vote
against.4 9 One suspects that this more sophisticated understanding of the
power of abstention is the norm, that legislators, and certainly legislative
leaders, would be wise to this sort of potential outcome (even if they
don't fully understand how it works). The same cannot be said, however,
for amateurs.
2. "Ordinary Societies"
We would expect problems like this to arise more frequently in
smaller, less professional democratic institutions-in particular, those in-
stitutions large enough to formalize decision procedures yet not so large
as to expect the kind of expertise that comes with professional (or even
semi-professional) parliamentarians. In the United States, millions of
these institutions make countless decisions every day. The list includes
governmental organizations (municipalities, school boards, and other lo-
cal governmental entities), business firms (corporations, partnerships,
and other forms of business ownership), and nonprofit organizations
(charitable organizations, community associations, churches, and civic
clubs).
45. Id.; Hayden, supra note 1, at 611.
46. Radtke, supra note 38, at 1013.
47. Id.
48. See CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE,
RESEARCH, AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 543-45 (Greenwood Press, 1989).
49. See, e.g., C.P. Trussell, Senate Approves 4 Peace Treaties, Rejecting Delay, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,
1947, at 1, 3 (describing how Senators in favor of ratification of a treaty were "paired" against two Sen-
ators who opposed ratification).
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a. The Significance of "Ordinary Societies"
These more "ordinary societies" play a significant role in the lives of
their members. Take, for example, community associations. Community
associations are real estate developments where the owners are bound to
membership in the organization. 0 They come in a variety of forms-
homeowner associations, condominiums, and cooperatives, to name a
few-and many different legal names-a common interest development
in California is much like a planned unit development in Georgia."
Whatever the name, though, these are a significant and growing feature
of the real estate landscape and, thus, people's day-to-day lives.
These community associations play a significant social and economic
role in the United States. As of 2014, there were over 333,600 community
associations with over 66 million residents in the United States, with
thousands of new associations formed each year.52 Close to a quarter of
all homes in the United States, valued at over $4.5 trillion, are now part
of such associations;" they collect yearly assessments totaling $70 billion
from their homeowners.5 4 And over 2 million people serve on community
association boards.55
b. Robert's Rules of Order
Community associations, like most organizations making group de-
cisions, usually adopt some form of decisionmaking procedures. And the
most commonly used manual of procedure, by a great margin, is Robert's
Rules of Order.6 Henry Martyn Robert, a Colonel in the U.S. Army, first
published his manual of procedure in 1876.11 His interest in the subject
was sparked in 1863, when he was asked to preside over a meeting and
felt that he lacked the necessary knowledge of procedure." After subse-
quent stints in several other social organizations, and extensive study of
the more formal parliamentary law used by legislative bodies, he devised
and published a system designed to be used in more "ordinary socie-
ties."" His manual, now in its eleventh edition and titled Robert's Rules of
50. See Jim Slaughter, Community Association Statutes and Procedures, http://www.jimslaughter.
com/Community-Association-Statutes-and-Procedures-.cfm (last visited Nov. 1, 2015).
51. See id.
52. See Foundation for Community Association Research, Community Association Fact Book,
National and State Statistical Review for 2014, available at http://www.cairf.org/research/fact




56. See Jim Slaughter, Parliamentary Procedure in 2005, THE TOASTMASTER (Feb. 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.jimslaughter.com/Parliamentary-Procedure-in-the-21st-Century.cfm.
57. See HENRY M. ROBERT III ET AL., ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER NEWLY REVISED xxiii (11th
ed. 2011).
58. See id. at xl.
59. See id at xliii.
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Order Newly Revisedf6 runs to over 650 pages and has been supplement-
ed by more user-friendly In Brief edition6 (a mere 176 pages) and various
online resources.62
Robert's Rules of Order, like any manual of procedure, is often for-
mally adopted by an organization. Let's return to community associations
to see how that might work. Members of community associations are sub-
ject to a governing set of documents -the Covenants, Conditions and Re-
strictions (CCRs)-that require compliance with various rules and the
payment of assessments." Community associations also typically have a
constitutions and/or bylaws that, among other things, provide the deci-
sionmaking procedures for the association boards." Most community as-
sociations use Robert's Rules of Order.5 Indeed, several states provide
Robert's Rules as the default decisionmaking procedure by statute."
North Carolina is typical of this approach, requiring of its planned com-
munities that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the bylaws, meetings of
the association and the executive board shall be conducted in accordance
with the most recent edition of Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised."67
Thus, millions of homeowners are bound to associations that must-by
contract, statute, or both-make decisions in a way that complies with
Robert's Rules of Order.
Community associations are, of course, just one example of the
many types of organizations that make use of Robert's Rules. Many mu-
nicipalities, for example, use the rules as their procedural guide.6 A wide
range of other public and private entities do so as well. In most cases, the
choice of procedural rules is made through the organization's constitution
or bylaws, or perhaps even more informally. But in some cases, as with
community associations, states require Robert's Rules as the default pro-
cedure for certain organizations. This is true of groups ranging from the
Kansas Credit Union Council' to the Alabama Board for Registered In-
terior Designers.70 Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised is the manual
of choice when it comes to group decisionmaking in the United States.',
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. The Official Robert's Rules of Order Web Site, ROBERT'S RULES, http://www.roberts
rules.coml (last visited Nov. 1, 2015).
63. See Community Association Statutes and Procedures, supra note 50.
64. See id.
65. See Parliamentary Procedure in 2005,supra note 56.
66. See, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. § 514B-121(d) (2014) (Hawaii condominiums); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 47F-3-108(c) (2015) (North Carolina planned communities); OR. REV. STAT. § 94.657(1) (2015) (Ore-
gon planned communities).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47F-3-108(c) (2014) (emphasis added).
68. A search for the term "Robert's Rules of Order" in the Lexis municipal code database turns
up close to 1,500 results.
69. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2232(c) (2013).
70. ALA. CODE. § 34-15C-4(e)(3) (2014).
71. It is the manual of choice of around eighty-five percent of democratic institutions in the Unit-
ed States. See Parliamentary Procedure in 2005, supra note 56.
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In most ways, standardizing meeting procedures is a good thing.
Henry Robert originally envisioned his manual of procedure as a way to
save time and lend some predictability as people move among "ordinary
societies." 7 2 It's certainly done that. And given its long history, the editors
of Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised have had plenty of time to
work out the kinks. The problem with standardization, though, is that any
problems that remain are thrust upon large numbers of groups. Robert's
Rules, unfortunately, has one of those problems when it comes to its
counsel on the effect of abstentions in many relative quota situations.
Most of the votes taken under Robert's Rules of Order use a simple
majority quota. But the rules also require a two-thirds majority for a
number of significant organizational decisions, including those involving
some fundamental and potentially contentious issues. (Indeed, superma-
jority quotas are usually reserved for these more important decisions in
order to ensure consensus on important matters.) The two-thirds quota,
for example, is mandated for motions to suspend the rules and to close
debate on a question.73 The quota is also used for votes on fundamental
organizational changes such as removing members,7 4 removing officers,75
and amending an organization's bylaws.76 Paradoxically enough, a two-
thirds vote is also required to adopt a parliamentary authority.77 In all of
these two-thirds quota situations, as with any other votes under the rules,
members have the option to abstain.78 The question then becomes:
what does the parliamentary authority say about the impact of such
abstentions?
Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised, along with its brief guide
and online resources, gives quite a bit of guidance on the subject of ab-
stentions. With respect to withholding a vote in situations with an abso-
lute quota (generally disfavored by Robert's Rules),7 9 it accurately notes
that such an abstention functions as a vote against the proposition t The
rest of its advice about abstentions assumes they are made in the more
favored relative quota situations, and complies with the commonplace
understanding that abstentions are neutral with respect to outcome. For
example, members with are counseled to abstain on questions in which
they have a direct personal or pecuniary interest." This advice wouldn't
make sense if the abstention were thought to affect the outcome.
More straightforwardly, and more troubling, Robert's Rules of Order
supplementary guides advise that, for all relative quotas, abstentions have
72. See ROBERT ET AL., supra note 57, at xl-xlv.
73. See id. at 401.
74. See id. at 648.
75. See id. at 653-54. This may also be done by a majority vote of the entire membership. See id.
76. See id. at 307, 592. This may also be done by a majority vote of the entire membership. See id.
77. See id. at 13. This may also be done by a majority vote of the entire membership. See id.
78. See id. at 407.
79. See id. at 403.
80. See id. It does so, though, in a rather confused fashion. See Hayden, supra note 1, at 606.
81. See ROBERT ET AL., supra note 57, at 407.
No. 2] 437
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
no effect on the outcome. Take, for example, the manual's advice when it
comes to the all important step when the chair puts a question to the
group: "Most motions require a majority of those present and voting to
pass. Some require a two-thirds vote. (Abstentions- instances in which
members who are present do not vote-are not counted and have no ef-
fect on the result.)"" The online guide contains similar advice, noting that
"abstentions have absolutely no effect on the outcome of the vote since
what is required is either a majority or two thirds of the votes cast."8
This advice, as we now know, is wrong. In relative quota situations,
abstentions reduce the number of votes necessary to pass the proposition,
and, importantly, do so in proportion to the quota. With relative majority
quotas, this isn't a problem, because abstentions reduce the number of
votes on a one-to-one basis so, as advertised, they do not affect the out-
come. But with two-thirds quotas, the reduction comes unevenly, result-
ing in an abstention being equivalent to casting a vote weighted two-
thirds in favor of the proposition. This effect, as recounted above, has
fooled even professional legislators-it would certainly catch less sophis-
ticated voters off guard.
There's little doubt, given the multitude of organizations relying on
Robert's Rules of Order, that many have made mistakes like this on im-
portant votes. Such problems are even more likely on votes to remove
members or officers, where tensions run high and the interpersonal costs
of voting may prompt more abstentions than usual. It is here that we
would expect most mistakes to be made. Indeed, we see evidence of or-
ganizational reliance on this misleading advice when membership dis-
putes spill over into the courts. In a recent New York case, for example,
the plaintiff, Melvyn Meer, challenged his removal from a School Leader-
ship Team that used Robert's Rules of Order.' The chair of the organiza-
tion "informed the SLT members that a two thirds majority vote was re-
quired, and that abstentions had no effect on the outcome of a vote under
their bylaws and Robert's Rules of Order."" Meer was subsequently re-
moved on a five to one vote with six abstentions, and the court ruled
against his claim."s
There are, then, many situations involving relative quotas other than
a simple majority where voters, both sophisticated and not, have been
fooled by the effect of abstaining. This shouldn't be surprising, especially
in the case of members of more ordinary societies like community associ-
ations, both because the effects are counterintuitive and because the par-
liamentary bible of such societies, Robert's Rules of Order, gives them
advice that is patently false. But there are also situations where even
82. See id. at 24 (emphasis added).
83. See Frequently Asked Questions: Question 6, ROBERT's RuLEs, http://www.robertsrules.
com/faq.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (emphasis added).
84. Meer v. Klein, 2008 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 108315-08, 2008 WL 5108134 (N.Y. Sup. 2008).
85. Id. at *4 ¶ 2 (emphasis added).
86. See id. at *6 f 2.
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larger electorates may be fooled by the power of abstention in the form
of the No-Show Paradox.
B. Large Electorates Using Plurality Runoff Procedures
Many democratic bodies, small and large, use voting procedures that
are vulnerable to the No-Show Paradox-situations where a person is
better off abstaining than voting their true preferences. For example, vir-
tually all legislative bodies, and some smaller bodies that follow standard
parliamentary procedure, use some version of the sequential process
known as the amendment procedure to pass laws, resolutions, and other
propositions.87 These procedures, as we saw above, are vulnerable to the
Paradox." Indeed, the amendment procedure can even give rise to situa-
tions where every voter is better off abstaining rather than voting.89
Another version of the Paradox may occur in situations involving
certain non-sequential voting procedure applied to just two altematives."
Many legislative bodies and committees, for example, have quorum re-
quirements, which require that a certain number of members be present
to conduct business. 91 If a voter is against a proposal, her goal is achieved
if either the quorum requirement is met and a majority votes against the
proposal or the quorum requirement is not met. Voters in this position
sometimes make the (correct) calculation that they are more likely to de-
feat the proposal by abstaining (and thus not counting toward the quor-
um) than by showing up and voting against it.9 And, indeed, there is good
evidence that this "quorum busting" version of the Paradox has occurred,
as when several Democrats in the Texas state legislature fled to Oklaho-
ma and New Mexico in 2003 to defeat a quorum requirement in an at-
tempt to prevent passage of a redistricting bill." But both of these exam-
ples-the amendment procedure and voting with a quorum re-
quirement -usually involve relatively sophisticated voters, so we would
not expect them to be fooled (indeed, in the case of quorum busting, leg-
islators are using the effect to achieve their desired ends).
87. For a discussion of the procedure and its vulnerability to voting and abstention paradoxes, see
Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV.
971, 1012 (1989); Hayden, supra note 1, at 599-600.
88. See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
89. See Hayden, supra note 1, at 599-600; Nurmi, supra note 20, at 32.
90. For a discussion of these procedures, see Hayden, supra note 1, at 600-01.
91. See C6rte-Real & Pereira, supra note 24, at 351; Aguiar-Conraria & Magalhides, supra note
24, at 2.
92. This has also happened on a large scale. In 2005, Italian voters were presented with a refer-
endum that would have liberalized the regulation of in vitro fertilization. Italian law required both a
majority participation quorum and majority support for passage. The Catholic Church opposed the
measure, and Pope Benedict XVI gave a speech just four days before the vote asking, "What is the
principle of wisdom, if not to abstain from all that is odious to God?" Even though ninety percent of
people who actually voted supported the changes, turnout was well below the majority quorum, leading
to defeat of the measure. See Aguiar-Conraria & Magalhies, supra note 24, at 2.
93. Democrats on the Run, Again, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,2003, at A18.
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1. The Vulnerability of Runoff Procedures
Certain voting procedures used in larger elections, however, are also
vulnerable to the Paradox. The plurality runoff procedure is one such
procedure. The plurality runoff procedure is a successive voting mecha-
nism used to ensure majority support of a single candidate.9" After the
first round of voting, if any candidate receives majority support, then she
is declared the winner. But if none of the alternatives receive majority
support, then the two alternatives receiving the most votes are placed in a
runoff to choose the winner. 95 At that stage, with only two remaining can-
didates, one will almost certainly receive majority support."
A simple example shows just how significantly the Paradox can af-
fect a plurality runoff. Take the following preference profile over three
candidates:'
TABLE 2
47% of voters 2% of voters 26% of voters 25% of voters
Alan Alan Casey Beth
Beth Beth Alan Casey
Casey Casey Beth Alan
If everyone votes, then in the first round, Alan (49%) and Casey
(26%) make it to the runoff, while Beth (25%) is eliminated. In the run-
off, Casey (51%) beats Alan (49%). Thus, if everyone votes, Casey wins
the election. If the large group of voters on the left abstain, however, we
get a different result, and one that is more in line with their preferences.
Take those voters away, and the first round results in the need for a run-
off between Casey (26%) and Beth (25%) (neither of those candidates
receives a majority of the remaining 53% of the voters, for Alan plays the
spoiler here). In the runoff, Beth (27%) beats Casey (26%). Thus, if the
people on the left vote, the winner is Casey, and they are stuck with their
least-preferred candidate. If, on the other hand, those people abstain,
then Beth wins the election. And while Beth is not that group's favorite
94. See Hayden, supra note 1, at 598; RIKER, supra note 19, at 74-76, 85-88; Jeffrey C. O'Neill,
Everything That Can Be Counted Does Not Necessarily Count: The Right to Vote and the Choice of a
Voting System, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 327,333 (2006).
95. There are at least two versions of plurality runoff procedures. This example uses top-two
runoff voting, which is one of the most common election methods. See O'Neill, supra note 94, at 333.
Another variation is an elimination runoff election, where the alternatives with the lowest totals are
eliminated in successive rounds until there is a majority support for one alternative. Id. at 334. With
just three alternatives, this distinction does not matter. The latter version also forms the basis of instant
runoff voting, where voters ranks the alternatives in order of preference. The votes are then distributed
to the alternatives according to first choices. If none of the alternatives receives a majority, then the
alternative with the fewest number of votes is eliminated and its votes transferred to the next choice, a
process that gets repeated until on alternative has a majority. Id.
96. Yes, if there's an even number of voters, the two remaining candidates could tie. That doesn't
happen very often in large elections.
97. This example is adapted from Nurmi, supra note 20, at 31 tbl.7.
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candidate, she is still strictly preferred to Casey. All of the people on the
left, then, should just stay at home during the election. While this exam-
ple was manufactured to demonstrate a point, the plurality runoff proce-
dure is truly vulnerable to the No-Show Paradox.
2. Runoff Procedures in American Politics
Runoffs are a well-established feature of the American political sys-
tem: they are the most common single-winner election method in the
United States after the simple plurality vote." Most of the South-
including Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas-still use it in their pri-
maries to fill federal and state offices.9 (South Dakota uses it in other sit-
uations.'0) And while there have been movements to reduce the frequen-
cy of runoff elections,"o" the procedure remains an entrenched part of
Southern politics.
Last year's election results reveal situations where the No-Show
Paradox may have been at play. For example, in the first round of the
Democratic Primary for Georgia's 1" Congressional District, Brian Reese
captured 34% of the vote, Amy Tavio 33.8%, and Marc Smith 32.2%.'0
This led to a runoff election, where Reese who clearly picked up most of
Smith's supporters, crushed Tavio 63.1% to 36.9%.1os Simplifying the
numbers slightly, we can consistently redescribe the preferences and se-
quence of events in a way that bears remarkable similarity to the example
with Alan, Beth, and Casey above:
98. See O'Neill, supra note 94, at 333.
99. Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Primary Runoffs, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
elections-and-campaigns/primary-runoffs.aspx (last updated May 12, 2014); see also CHARLES S.
BULLOCK III & LOCH K. JOHNSON, RUNoFF ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 2, 3 tbl.1.1 (1992);
Federal Primary Runoff Elections and Voter Turnout Declines, 1994-2014, FAIRVOTE, Nov. 2014,
http://www.fairvote.org/researcht-reports/federal-primary-runoff-elections-and-voter-turnout-declines-
1994-201/. Louisiana uses it in all of their elections, which is why their last race for the U.S. Senate was
not decided until a December 6 runoff election. See Richard Fausset, Mary Landrieu is Defeated by Bill
Cassidy in Louisiana Senate Runoff, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/
us/politics/mary-landrieu-is-defeated-by-bill-cassidy-in-louisiana-senate-runoff.html?_r=0.
100. Runoffs are held in South Dakota for U.S. Senator, U.S. Representative, and governor. S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 12-6-51.1 (2014).
101. For example, a bill was introduced in the Alabama House of Representatives to decrease the
percentage triggering a runoff to thirty-five percent from fifty percent. See H.B. 488 (Ala. 2013), avail-
able at http://legiscan.com/AUtext/HB488/2013. However, the bill was proposed indefinitely. See Legis-
lative Research, Alabama House Bill 488, LEGISCAN, http://legiscan.com/ALIJresearchlHB488/2014
(last visited Nov. 2,2015).
102. Georgia's 1st Congressional District Elections, 2014, BALLOTPEDIA, available at http://
ballotpedia.org/Georgia%27s_1stCongressional Districtelections_2014 (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
103. Id. Unfortunately for Reese, he later lost to Republican Earl "Buddy" Carter in the general
election. Id.
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TABLE 3
30% of voters 3% of voters 34% of voters 32% of voters
Tavio Tavio Reese Smith
Smith Smith Tavio Reese
Reese Reese Smith Tavio
With these numbers, Reese (34%) and Tavio (33%) make it to the
runoff, while Smith (32%) is eliminated, which is consistent with what ac-
tually happened. Then, in the runoff, Reese (66%) soundly beats Tavio
(33%), also pretty consistent with the actual election results.
But what if the group of Tavio supporters on the left abstained in
both rounds of voting? In that case, the first round results in a runoff be-
tween Reese (34%) and Smith (32%) (neither of those candidates re-
ceives a majority of the remaining 70% of the voters, for Tavio (3%)
plays the spoiler). In the runoff, Smith (35%) beats Reese (34%). Thus, if
the group on the left votes, the winner is Reese, and they are stuck with
their least-preferred candidate. If, on the other hand, they abstain, then
Smith wins the election. And while Smith is not the group's favorite, he is
still strictly preferred to Reese.
Without more extensive information about voter preferences -such
as rank-order preferences over the full range of candidates-it's hard to
tell whether this was actually a situation where some significant portion
of the electorate would have been better off staying home. But these
large-scale, runoff elections are certainly situations that involve unso-
phisticated voters and vulnerable decision procedures. So it's certainly
possible.
In a way, none of this should be all that surprising. We have known
for a long time that runoff procedures were vulnerable to strategic voting,
where members of the electorate could vote against their true prefer-
ences at certain stages of the process in order to achieve their ultimate
objective (either by electing their candidate of choice or at least avoiding
a less-preferred candidate). In fact, according to Arrow's theorem, this is
true of every possible voting procedure that meets some minimal condi-
tions of fairness and rationality."m We now know that voters may also
strategically withhold their votes as well. That alone is, I think, signifi-
cant. And the same sort of thing can also happen with respect to any elec-
tion with a spoiler candidate.
In this article, though, I'm more interested in the flip side of these
vulnerabilities. Yes, voting procedures, given certain conditions, are sus-
104. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951);
DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECIONS (1963). For a recent summary of the
state of social choice theory and Arrow's theorem, see 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND
wELFARE (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 2002), see also Implications of Arrow's Theorem, supra note
19, at 301-02, for a basic explanation of the theorem.
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ceptible to being manipulated by strategically voting or abstaining. But
the fact that voters may unwittingly hurt themselves by merely voting
their true preferences is more disconcerting. That is, the No-Show Para-
dox describes situations where voters are better off, by their own
measures, staying at home on election day. Like the nalve followers of
Robert's Rules, who withhold their votes in the mistaken belief that doing
so cannot affect outcomes, voters in these situations oftentimes vote
when they're better off abstaining.
IV. CONCLUSION
The counterintuitive effects of abstention are real-world features of
democratic decisionmaking. When voters fall victim, they vote, or fail to
vote, against their best interests (by their own measures). When this hap-
pens to legislators, it can, of course, have an immediate effect on the
course of the law. But more troubling is the fact that the procedures of
hundreds of thousands of "ordinary societies," many of which have signif-
icant influence over the lives of their members, are vulnerable. The less
sophisticated voters that populate those public and private boards and
committees are much more likely to be caught off guard by the effect of
an abstention on an outcome. And their decisions are often given legal
effect under many state laws. Abstaining, then, carries with it real legal
consequences that are often at odds with the intentions of many voters.
These counterintuitive effects of withholding votes are exacerbated
by the lack of competent guidance about the consequences of abstaining
in many common situations. Indeed, the American bible of parliamentary
procedure, Robert's Rules of Order, gives mistaken advice about the ef-
fect of abstention in some of the most significant decisions that may be
made under the rules. While there are not any voting procedures immune
from all of the perverse effects of abstention, voters need to be aware of
the possibilities to avoid being taken by surprise. Consider this Article
the first attempt to remedy that situation.
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